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lose the body of tradition and law that
defines our homeland.
The editors cover an ambitious amount
of ground for such a slim volume, and
the space available does not permit a
variety of perspectives on each topic.
An examination into the U.S. government’s reactions to racial and political
unrest at home after the McCarthy era,
for instance, would have been welcome.
However, the book’s essays seem selected to provoke the reader to explore
their subjects more deeply, and the contributions are uniformly well supported. The citations provide ample
direction for readers wishing to explore
on their own the issues presented.
RANDY L. UNGER

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Homeland Defense & American Security Affairs

Cann, John P. Brown Waters of Africa: Portuguese
Riverine Warfare, 1961–1974. St. Petersburg, Fla.:
Hailer, 2007. 248pp. $29.99

Counterinsurgency warfare is what used
to be called “colonial warfare.” Although the association might make
some people uncomfortable—Americans perhaps more than most, given
their aversion to colonialism—much of
the strategic intent and many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures of
modern counterinsurgency derive directly from the colonial wars and police
actions of the past.
In some respects riverine warfare suffers from the taint of colonialism more
than do other aspects of counterinsurgency, a prejudice that is currently reinforced by the apparent trend for
insurgents who worry the West to center their operations in urban rather
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than rural environments and to seek
sanctuary in the anonymity of cities
rather than remote countrysides. In
many parts of the world, however,
rivers remain the principal transport
routes, and their control remains of
fundamental importance to the success
or failure of insurgent movements.
The last great colonial empire in Africa
was Portuguese, and a history of the
riverine campaigns fought in its defense
between 1961 and 1974 is long overdue.
John P. Cann, a retired Marine Corps
University professor with a doctorate in
African counterinsurgency from King’s
College London, shows that the Portuguese took what they could from British
and, particularly, French experiences
and adapted it to suit their particular
circumstances and the often limited resources at their disposal.
After placing the total effort in the strategic context of the Cold War, the historical context of twentieth-century
Portuguese history, and the contemporaneous political context of the regime
of António de Oliveira Salazar, Cann
demonstrates how the Portuguese navy
and naval infantry, the fuzileiros, fought
an effective campaign in three diverse
theaters: on the rivers of Angola; on the
Rovuma River and Lake Niassa in Mozambique; and among the estuaries,
deltas, and swamp forests of the West
African enclave of Bissau.
Cann recounts with balance and clarity
the lessons the Portuguese drew from
the experience. Insurgency is political
war where the center of gravity is the
population. Consequently, the naval
role differs very little from that of the
army. The essence is to develop and
maintain contact with the civilian population so close and regular that it often
amounts to “armed social work.”
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Presence—achieved by living, and conducting river and foot patrols, among
local people to gain their trust and to
build sound knowledge about the enemy—is equally important, as is, at the
same time, keeping the insurgents off
balance through the use of deception
and irregular patrol patterns, a combination the Portuguese were able to
achieve because units were deployed in
two-year cycles.
The Portuguese also learned the importance of joint effort. Wherever the navy
and army disagreed and failed to operate together, which happened in Bissau
particularly, results were affected. Also,
that no campaign could be isolated
from the wider political context was a
lesson that became painfully apparent
following a militarily successful but politically damaging raid on Conakry, the
capital of Guinea, to free hostages and
destroy insurgent sanctuaries.
In short, all practitioners and students
of riverine warfare will be grateful that
John P. Cann has written such an excellent account.
MARTIN N. MURPHY

Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies
Shrivenham, England

Smith, Perry M., and Daniel M. Gerstein. Assignment Pentagon: How to Excel in a Bureaucracy. 4th
ed. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007.
273pp. $22.95

For this, the fourth edition of his well
received book, Major General Perry M.
Smith, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), has added
a coauthor, Colonel Daniel M. Gerstein,
U.S. Army (Ret.). Colonel Gerstein
served for twenty-six years in combat,
peace, and humanitarian operations.
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He also served in the Pentagon for almost ten years in senior advisory and
leadership roles.
This edition has been expanded into
sixteen chapters, each adding considerable value to the publication. One of
the more interesting and vital chapters
for properly grasping the workings of
“the building” is devoted to “understanding the process.” This chapter succinctly describes the Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS), the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), and the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). These entities are extremely complex by their very
natures, but it is vital to understand
how they all fit together for our nation’s defense. The authors do a superb
job of simplifying these systems, giving
additional references for in-depth
understanding.
Smith and Gerstein also briefly address
military ethics, touching upon military
interaction with Congress and ethics
within the executive branch. Problems
are identified and solutions are suggested, but it is beyond the scope and
intention of this book to address these
issues other than superficially. The
reader should already be educated regarding ethics and ethical behavior; this
chapter serves simply to remind us that
doing the “right thing” continues to be
difficult at times.
As with the earlier editions, the present
one addresses many day-to-day business elements related to serving at the
Pentagon. The book allows the reader,
whether a newly assigned military
member or civilian, to obtain a preliminary understanding of the complex nature of this intense mixture of military
and civilian bureaucracies.
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